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1. Introduction
Charles Keely's fundamental reanalysis of the refugee
regime is ambitious. His goal is bolder still - to identify
the patterns behind refugee flows so that those flows can be
anticipated, thereby enabling the suffering to be ameliorated
and even, perhaps, prevented. Keely's method in developing
this thesis is based on theoretical assertion rather than a
critical comparison of extant theories or induction from
empirical data.
Keely argues that the refugee problem is rooted in the
nation-state system. Nationalism presumes that every nation is
entitled to a state, while the state system has an interest in
minimizing the number of states in order to preserve a
manageable system. There exists an incongruence between the
large number of nations, each directed by a universal norm
that each nation should have its expression through a
political state, and the small number of states. The author
refers to this as the geopolitical root of the refugee
problem.
This instability of the state system leads to three
distinct though sometimes overlapping bases for refugee
production - multinational realities, ideology, and state
implosion. The first of these is a corrollary of the
structural depiction. After all, if there are many more
nations than states, then some states must consist of many
nations. Since the normative model dictates that each state
should have its own state, multi-national states are
2inherently unstable. The responses to that instability may
entail one of four solutions according to Keely: development
of a new supernational identity, domination by one cultural
group, ethnic cleansing, and confederation arrangements. But
this is not the only source of instability. There may be
debates and conflicts over the form of the state (political
ideology) and there may be an inability to make the state
operational resulting in state implosion.
Not only are the causes of refugee production not
understood according to Keely, but the treatment is rooted in
an aberration - the bipolar world of the Cold War - and has no
validity outside that context. In that aberrant period,
western states practiced the equivalent of "bleeding" in
mediaeval medical practice on the presumption that communist
states were afflicted with bad humours. Bleeding both gave
comfort to those who escaped and, at the same time, provided
testimony to the instability and disequilibrium of such
authoritarian regimes. As a result of the end of the Cold War
and the commitments and practices built up in that period, the
system for responding to the by-products of the developing
nation-state system, namely refugees, has broken down. There
is too much emphasis on asylum and resettlement which distort
the refugee system and encourage refugee flows. The emphasis
should be on repatriation, with resettlement confined to
desperate cases.
Keely is to be applauded for seeking fundamental answers
to this critical problem of our time. Unfortunately, his
analysis is erroneous and misconceived both in the overall
portrait and in the fine details. I will concentrate on the
overall picture and slip in crticisms of detail where I can.
2. Queries and Propositions
3Are nations the backbone, the skeletal structure, of the
nation-state system, providing continuity through changes in
the ideology and functioning of states as Keely suggests? Are
nations the constants and states the variables in the
international system? Or do states provide the spatial frame
for stability while nations alter over time as they try to
preserve their continuity? What about the relationship between
the two? Are nations and states even part of the same system,
each with different functions, or are we misguidedly reducing
both to a common system just because they are conjoined in
linguistic practice? If both are part of one system having a
common function, is the function of the nation-state system to
provide stability and seek an equilibrium in the face of the
shifting techtonics of the dialectic of nation and state, or
are nation-states dynamic and changing elements in a larger
set of systems in which the goal is not equilibrium but the
smooth management of change?
I want to suggest arguments for three propositions and
then a fourth corollary when the first three are applied to
refugees. Given space limitations, I can only suggest them.
First, nations are not stable continuous elements through
time. A nation is not analogous to a skeletal structure.
Rather, nations are the sources of dynamic change as the
conception of a collectivity alters and defines itself over
time. Secondly, even though states come into being, change
configurations, and even merge, they are there to provide
stability and leverage for the military musculature that is
the monopoly and characteristic complement of the state
system. Third, though states provide the international
skeletal system of stability using military means to do so
when required, nations and states are not part of the same
system because they do not have the same functions. Nations
4and states are two among a larger set of systems for providing
organization and dynamic order to a developing international
system.
When the interactions of these various systems are
understood, it will become clear that refugees are not the by-
product of the shifting techtonics in the dialectic of the
nation and the state. Nor are the current solutions simply the
remains of the Cold War. It may indeed be true that
repatriation needs to be emphasized, but not because we have
placed too great a reliance on resettlement. The historical
dialectic of responding to refugee crises must itself be
understood as part of another system in interaction with both
the system of nations and the systems of states.
3. The State System
Keely depicts two very different purposes of the state.
Ideally, it is the political expression of the nation. This I
refer to as the Herder thesis.1 On a more 'realistic' plain,
it is "the institution for legitimately exercising power and
extracting resources for the purpose of providing order,
protection, and decisions on the use or distribution of
extracted resources." This is not a Lockian definition of the
state which serves to ensure the preservation of the property
of its citizens2 or its complement, the Marxist depiction of
the state as the instrument of ruling class interests.3 It is
a traditional social democratic vision of a welfare state in
which a democratic government responsible to its electors is
used as an instrument for the distribution of surplus value.4
If it is to do the latter, then while it protects its own
dominant nation, it unalterably opposes the creation of new
states. In other words, the state is defined, at one and the
5same time, in nationalist and in political-economic power
terms. As a result, there is a tension between the nation and
the state such that, "states resist formation of new states
and nationalism tends towards multiplication of states."
Presumably, within any multi-national state (a state
constituted of several nations), the result is also a tension
within the state between its two different functions.
Keely follows Aristotle's differentiation between the
ideal purposes of the state and the actual functions of its
political institutions.5 However, Aristotle never envisioned a
united political entity to rule over or express the
commonality of Hellas. Ideally, the state was an ethical
ideal, the expression of the common ethos rather than the
expression of an ethné, compact enough to provide an
integrated system of education in social ethics to facilitate
the moral perfection of its members and the determination of
what is just. States had no interest in ethné, in ethnicity or
nationalism in modern parlance. In applying this ideal to
actual institutions, Aristotle followed the principle that the
state was an instrument for the distribution of benefits, and
it rewarded individuals in proportion to the contribution each
made to the state. The state was a distributor of largesse
based on contributions to the polis rather than a recipient of
surplus value or a distributor of that value to ensure equity
or to develop the capacities of its members.
In the contention that the ideal state exists for the
preservation of the political community and the expression of
the nation, Keely provides a schizphrenuic counterpoint to his
realist thesis in sharp contrast to Hegel who finds congruency
between collective self-expression and individual interests.
In Hegel, this is accomplished institutionally only when there
is a recognition of the right of citizens to participate in
6political decisions without detracting from their rights to a
private sphere in the modern separation of state and society.6
The ethical ideal and the state as the expression of an 
are combined with both the separation of state and society and
the republican institutional vision vesting political
authority in the citizens of a state. To accomplish this
vision, the institutions of the state facilitated the full
development of each member of the state and did not just
distribute rewards proportionate to the individual's
contribution to the state. Thus, the state served the
individual at the same time as the individual acted in the
interests of the whole community.
In contrast to both Arisotle and Hegel's very different
congruent dualist versions of the state, in Keely, in contrast
to Aristotle, the ethical goal is removed altogether. In
contrast to Hegel, the ideal function of the state is reduced
to serving an ethné which has no 'spirit'. Further, in the
state's institutional organization, there is no necessary
connection with republicanism, the right of citizen
participation in political decision-making. There are various
sources of legitimacy, among which republicanism is simply one
ideological alternative. Finally, the state exercises power
and distributes 'surplus value' as a reflection of the
dominant ideology of the state which may be on the basis of
contributions of supporters, as a developer of citizen
capacities, or as an effort in distributive justice. Thus, the
mode of determining legitimacy, the method of exercising the
power gained, and the use of that power for distribution
purposes, have no guiding ethos. Each merely reflects the
dominant ideology of a society. In Marxism, this in turn is
determined by the dominant class.
Does the state exist as the expression and realization of
7the particularity of an ethné, or does it exist to facilitate
an ethné realizing itself as a unique expression of
universality? Or does the state have a very different
relationship to an ethné altogether? What about private
interests? Does the state exist to extract sufficient surplus
value so that order can be maintained to enable individuals to
pursue their private interests as in capitalist states or for
the state itself to determine the use of the remaining surplus
value for allegedly egalitarian purposes as in socialist
states or capacity building in welfare states? In the Keely
schema , the state determines the use of extracted resources.
This is not the current dominant ideology of the state.
Private and state interests may overlap, but of all the
separate functional systems making up the international
collectivity, state and private interests are perceived as
overlapping the least. This is particularly true in the new
global economic order of multinational corporations where 70%
of international trade is intra-company trade, where large
corporations are quickly losing their identification with a
single state, and states in turn have increasingly less
leverage and ability to tax the profits of these corporations.
The global economy is the nutritional system of the
international human organism that is committed to operating
relatively independently of the state skeletal system of the
international order. The current dominant ideology claims that
the state is not and should not be the determinor of the uses
of surplus value lest one reproduce the boneheaded gigantism
of the self-destructed soviet system or the more moderately
inflated bureaucracies of welfare democratic socialism or its
equivalent in military national socialist regimes.
Furthermore, Keely seems to equate all private interests
in society with economic interests when, in fact, the civil
8society, which is separate from the state, consists of not
only a system of interlocking interests, but also a system of
interlocking rights. This system of rights as part of the
international regulatory system (and not the system of
economic interests) is, in fact, the key regulator of the flow
of refugees. Now it is true that many theorists (including
Hegel) emphasize the state as the expression and realization
of the rights of the individual rather than as (or for some in
addition to) the determinor of the uses of surplus value or as
the protector and expression of the nation. Clearly, Keely is
not one of them. On the other hand, in Keely's definition of
the state, the state has no relationship whatsoever to the
protection and realization of individual rights and liberties.
The state is not only reduced to its role in interaction
with nationalism and economic interests in very different
ways, while ignoring the system of rights as as extraneous
add-on of a particular ideology which has nothing to say about
the essence of the state, but other systems are ignored as
well. In terms of refugees, one of the most important is the
international system of communications which has been far more
important in the international sphere to the treatment of
refugees than the end of the Cold War. In referring to a
communication system, I do not mean the transportation system
of which refugee flows are a part, but of the electronic
systems (telephone, television, computer internets, faxes) and
more traditional print media (books, magazines, newspapers)
that constitute the sensibilities, nerve endings and central
intelligence system so crucial to the operation of the state
system, the system of nations, the economic system, the
international regulatory system, and the transportation
system. The latter is concerned not simply with the means of
transport (wheeled vehicles travelling on highways, trains,
ships, airplanes), but with the people they transport as
9business travellers, tourists, immigrants and refugees. This
transportation system is not to be confused with another
system engaged in transportation, the ecological system, which
carries not only the waste products and toxic substances of
the economic system, and the biological organisms of the
diseases which afflict humans, but the world system of
immunization against diseases and for disposing of toxic
substances to maintain the life sphere of this fragile globe.
Now the state is the incubator and producer of the
international regulative system, the system of laws and
regulations that monitor the military system, the economic
system, the circulatory system, the ecological system and the
transportation system in great part in response to the
messages received and processed by the world-wide
communication system. One of the most important sets of
regulations apply to the international transportation system,
that is to the various classes of people that move about and
the movement of vehicles that transport them.
Thus far, I have pointed to rather than even sketched
eight international systems - the states, the military, the
community of nations, the global economy, international
communications, international transportation, international
law and the ecological system. They interact and are mutually
dependent on one another and are linked together by various
levels and types of culture. Primacy is not given to nations
or states let alone a purported nation-state system. Other
systems are not defined only in terms of a distorted
relationship to states and nations. However, before I return
to the nature and role of states, there is one additional
system that must be introduced - the reproductive system for
it is through the understanding of reproduction that we will
gain our first insight into the nature and functions of
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nations.
Keely entitled his paper, "The Nation, the State, and the
Reproduction of Refugees." This seems a most peculiar title
because in the body of the text he refers to the production
and not the reproduction of refugees. It is the nation that is
concerned with self-reproduction. Refugees, in Keely's
construct, are deviants, by-products of the mismatch between
the existing state system and the purported ideal norm of one
nation per state while most states of necessity consist of
more than one nation. These deviants threaten the sovereign
state system itself. They do not seem to possess any means of
self-reproduction within themselves, or, if they do, it would
seem to be associated with a cancerous variety by those who
view refugees as threats to civilization and order. In any
case, Keely does not follow that train of thought even if it
is sugeested by the title.
However, the slip (if that is what it is) does raise the
issue of reproduction. Is the nation the unit of self-
preservation through reproduction? In other words, is the
nation the equivalent of species or organisms in orthodox
Darwinian theory (or genes in neo-Darwinian sociobiological
theories where the purpose of reproductive behaviur is to
maximize the survival of an individual organism's genetic
material) competing with one another for reproductive success?
Aside from the unit of reproduction, what is the
mechanism? Is it classical Darwinian competitiveness in
adaptation to an environment, or are there historical and
structural contraints to the purported ideal model of perfect
competition in an ahistorical anarchic world or even an inner
directed and self organizing principle at work? Whatever the
answer, Keely, I believe is correct in one respect - the
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nation is best understood as the collective means of
preservation and reproduction of a culture and it is to a
deeper analysis of the nation that I now want to turn.
The Nation
Though Keely claims that the "nation is currrently the
normative basis for having a state," I am more concerned with
undertaking an analysis of the nation abstracted from the
state rather than understanding service to the nation as an
ideal of the state.7 With over 5,000 ostensible nations, Keely
claims that the lack of congruence creates a tension between
the 5,000 nations and the less than 200 states that have an
interest in stability and not the dramatic changes that come
from the pressures of each nation striving to have a state of
its own.
Here is the dichotomy. Are nations intent on having a
state of their own or are they interested in self-preservation
and reproduction in which a state may sometimes serve as a
useful tool, like a shell for a turtle? In the latter case,
one might describe the shell as undertaking the responsibility
for preserving the nation, but would not say that the shell
has a function of serving as the political expression of a
nation. This version of one state per nation I term the
crustacean view of the state.
Whatever the tensions within the state and between the
state and the nation, there is a prior conflict over what the
nation is. This debate is exemplified by Keely's discussion of
the various theories of the nation, differences which Keely
locates in the different scholarly views of the first modern
nation. Keely approaches the problem in terms of an
essentialist, that is determining the character of nationalism
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in terms of the essential characterization attributed to the
nation. I want to offer three views of nationalism focused on
only one country, Great Britain. All three perspectives have
in common the fact that they are geneological rather than
essentialist accounts of the nation.
Greenfeld (1992) assigns the genesis of the modern state
to England because, for her, the essence of the modern state
is the transfer of sovereignty from the King to the people.
Hence, the concept of "nation" underwent a transformation from
a reference to representatives of a political, cultural and
then social elite "to the population of the country and made
synonymous with the word 'people'."(p. 6) "National identity
in its distinctive modern sense is, therefore, an identity
which derives from membership in a 'people', the fundamental
characteristic of which is that it is defined as a 'nation'."
(p. 7) "The nation was perceived as a community of free and
equal individuals." (p. 30) Hence, Greenfeld sees nationalism
as the expression of a political ideology which asserts that
the people - however loosely defined - are sovereign and
constitute the ultimate authority in a state. Sovereignty is
vested in the population, a population constituted of
individuals. This is the essence of nationalism for Greenfeld.
Greenfeld suggests that the various characteristics of
nationalism - language, citizenship in the same state, shared
traditions, a common history, race, etc. - are related as in a
Wittgensteinian family resemblance; none of them are necessary
or essential to any particular expression of nationalism, but
at least some of them must characterize an expression of
nationalism.
The concept, however, did not remain stagnant. When this
idea of God's firstborn in the modern world was transported to
other countries, it became associated with a unique soverign
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people, where ethnicity became primary and sovereignty
derivative. With that transformation, the source of authority
became a collectivist one - rooted in fraternity - rather than
in an individualistic foundation of a political ideological
view of a sovereign nation in which each individual member had
the right to exercise his/her will. Thus, ethnicity
constitutes a mixture of various characteristics which can be
selected and combined to constitute a nation as a political
organizing principle.
As a result, there are two senses of nationalism for
Greenfeld - civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.
Critics have raised a number of problems with Greenfeld's
thesis. To mention only a few, if sovereignty in British
nationalism was vested in the people as a collection of
individuals, why did it take another two hundred years for
Catholic individuals to obtain the right to vote. Why was
suffrage restricted to such a small minority of the
population? Why was there a class basis to that suffrage in
terms of property ownership?
Greenfeld's answer to these questions is that the
questions demand that the species of British nationalism
emerge fully mature on the world stage, when, in fact, it
initially emerges in an infant stage in which the presumption
at the root of British nationalism has not yet been fully
realized. Nevertheless, "English national consciousness was
first and foremost the consciousness of one's dignity as an
individual. It implied and pushed toward (though it could not
necessitate the immediate realization of) the principles of
individual liberty and political equality. These notions were
primary in the definition of English nationhood." (p. 86) The
process of social restructuring within England, the Protestant
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reformation and the divine sanction it gave to the new
nationalism, the encouragement of the Tudors (with the
exception of Queen Mary's anti-national counter-reformational
policies), the use of the Bible and the spread of literacy,
all contributed to the gestation, development, and spread of
this new conception of the elite in whom sovereignty was
vested - English civic nationalism.
There is a second thesis which traces the development of
British nationalism to a response to exogenous rather than
indigenous forces. Nationalism results not so much from an
endogenous sui generis creation in Britain, but as a response
to external threats, specifically, the long and protracted
rivalry with France in successive wars - the Nine Years War
(1689-97), the War of Spanish Succession ( 1702-13), the War
of Austrian Succession (1739-48), the Seven Years War (1756-
63), the American Revolution (1776-83) in which France formed
an alliance with the breakaway thirteen colonies of North
America, the French Revolution (1793-1802), and the Napoleonic
wars (1803-15). Thus, the British identity was forged in the
Act of Union of 1707 joining Scotland to England and Wales
(recall that the Tudors were already Welsh royalty) in an
attempt to support the existing order against external
threats.8
There is another critique of Greenfeld's thesis of the
indiginous and sui generis origins of English nationalism as
well as the exogenous thesis of the development of nationalism
in relationship to the enemy-other. It is an
exogenous/endogenous theory of nationalist development in
relationship to proximate others. English nationalism was not
an indiginous product deformed into something else when it was
exported to the French and the Russians. Instead, English
nationalism was forged - as are all modern nationalisms - by
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the effort to regulate who could enter and acquire membership
in the English body politic and by control of the exit of its
own population. For example, in Robin Cohen's version of this
thesis,9 "a complex national and social identity is
continuously constructed and reshaped in its (often
antipathetic) interaction with outsiders, strangers,
foreigners and aliens - the 'others'. You know who you are by
knowing who you are not." (p. 1)10
The thrust of this thesis is that it places a theory such
as Greenfeld's within the long line of British apologetics for
British exclusiveness and uniqueness which is but part of the
"unease, affinity, antipathy, empathy, conflict and distaste
between the British and the rest of mankind." (p. 1) In other
words, Greenfeld offers not so much an explanation as a
manifestation of characteristic British nationalism on the
exclusivist side. According to Cohen, the historical reality
is that British nationalism has been forged in the attempt to
define the frontiers of its identity as the English interacted
with the Celts (Welsh, Scots, Irish), the Brits interacted
with its Dominions and then the empire and the Commonwealth,
and, currently, Europeans and Aliens, reforging its identity
at every stage along the way. Rather than the English having a
core and essential nationalism rooted in the dignity of the
individual, that nationalism was protean and given form and
reshaped by English and subsequently British interaction with
exogenous forces. However, unlike Colley's thesis, those
exogenous forces are not external enemies threatening the
existence of the state, but proximate other who penetrate the
permeable membrane surrounding the nation.
Attending only to the initial tension between an English
and a British identity, Cohen's historically developmental
thesis (like Colley's in this respect but in contrast to
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Greenfeld's essentialist one, where English connotes elitism,
class, linguistic and cultural superiority, and priviledge,
citizenship and the absence of its univocal definition in
British law to this very day in contrast with the French) is a
result of a passively received legal category rather than one
which was forged through self-assertion and self
identification in the active affirmation of people over the
body politic. Thus, it is the French revolution that forges
the notion of nationality built on citizenship (rather than an
English nationality à la Roger Brubaker 1992) or viewing the
French as an external threat and uniting to resist it..
Further, nationalism is not so much the product of an
ethereal idea (except, perhaps, in its revanchist versions) as
much as a predominantly practical and material answer in which
a powerful bourgeoisie and intelligentsia articulate the need
for a separate state or at least a degree of autonomy to
support economic development in response to past developmental
deformations and current economic opportunities, while a
competing bourgeoisie and intelligentsia argue the benefits of
material advance through cooperation and even incorporation
within a broader entity to provide greater access to markets,
an increased standard of living, and unboundaried
participation in a larger political system.
Let me term these respective theses on the forging of the
English/British identity the idealist/Whig (Greenfeld), the
realist (Colley), and the materialist/communitarian (Cohen)
theses. They are not just rival historical interpretations,
but different narratives in support of different conceptions
of the British national identity. In other words, they are not
simply neutral intellectual products, but part of the debate
about the British national character and its current identity.
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In the second thesis, identity is not primary; survival is.
Identity is forged in response to threats to internal security
and external challenges to hegemonic commercial and political
power and not simply a byproduct of visceral chauvinism or
dynamic responsiveness.
There is an irony in these various theses. Clearly, the
first (idealist) and the second (realist) theses are both
individualist, but also conservationist and conservative,
while the third thesis is communitarian and most open to the
other. However, both Cohen and Colley share the view that
nationalism is an imagined construct rather than an
organically and naturally emergent one, but in the Colley
view, that construct was an invention forged above all by war
and external threats rather than internal policies in dealing
with the perceived threat of the alien other, whether
indigenous or an immigrant or refugee. In the Colley thesis,
that construct is developed in response to an enemy Other, but
the Other lived beyond the boundaries, on other shores, rather
than within or threatening the control gates.
Immigrants and Refugees
By now it should be clear why I have detoured through
some different historical versions of the construction of
British identity alone - to indicate not only that Keely's
citing of one school is not only selective, but is itself part
of the intellectual defence of one version of national
identity, one rationalization for dealing with immigrants and
refugees, and  a contrast with realists who are Hobbesian at
heart. Further, instead of two core ideas of nationalism, I
wanted to provide a glimpse of several of the historical
constructions which both allegedly explain nationalism and
provide a rationale for dealing with alien immigrants and
refugees.
1. "(T)he most natural state is, therefore, one nation, an
extended family with one national character. This it retains
for ages and develops most naturally if the leaders come from
the people and are wholly dedicated to it. For a nation is as
natural a plant as a family, only with more branches. Nothing,
therefore, is more manifestly contrary to the purpose of
political government than the unnatural enlargement of
states." J.G. Herder, Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of
Mankind, IX:iv:2, p. 324 in F.M. Barnard, ed., Herder on
Social and Political Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969.
2. "The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the
preservation of their property." John Locke, The Second
Treatise of Government, IX:124. The juridical apparatus of
government exists to adjudicate property disputes by an
unbiased judge according to established laws, while the
executive branch ensures its execution.
3."(T)he state is the form in which the individuals of a
ruling class asert their common interests, and in which the
whole civil society of an epoch is epitomized." Karl Marx,
German Ideology, MEGA I/5, pp. 52-3, in T.B. Bottomore and
Maxmillian Rubel, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology
and Social Philosophy, Hammonsworth: Pelican, 1993, p. 228.
4. Cf. M. Beer, A History of British Socialism, London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1919, 336-7, or G.D.H. Cole, A History of
Socialist Thought: Volume III, The Second International, Part
II,  London: Macmillan, 1956, pp. 967-8.
5. Aristotle, Politics, I:2, 29-30.
6. By the time Hegel wrote the Philosophy of Right, after the
proclamation of the Karlsbad Decrees and the reintroduction of
both censorship and the reinstatement of the restoration
regimes espousing the divine origins of monarchic sovereignty
in opposition to a constitutional monarchy, republicanism is
conjoined in Hegel with a monarchy as its fulfillment, and the
juncture between the public and private realms is reduced to
to an invisible gap as the writing itself becomes more
convoluted and equivocal.
7. Keely does indicate near the end of the paper that
indigenous peoples, which may have claims to nationhood, are
accommodated in other ways.
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8. Cf. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
9. Robin Cohen, Frontiers of Identity: The British and the
Others, New York: Longman, 1994.
10. Earlier versions of this thesis were articulated in
Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in
British National development, 1536-1966, Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1975, and Keith
Robbins, Nineteenth-Century Britain: Integration and
Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
